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False Communications Offence Explained: Section 179 of the Online Safety Act 2023

Published 9 July 2026

Before January 2024, sending a false message online could be prosecuted under section 127(2) of the Communications Act 2003 — a broad provision that criminalised messages sent "for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety." The threshold was famously low. A prank. A hoax. A message that mildly irritated the recipient. All technically within scope. Critics called it overbroad and disproportionate — and Parliament listened.

On 31 January 2024, section 127(2) was repealed and replaced by section 179 of the Online Safety Act 2023. The new offence is narrower, more precise, and harder to prove — deliberately so. This guide explains what s.179 requires, what "non-trivial harm" means, and why the law changed.

Disclaimer: This is general information, not legal advice. Section 179 is new and the law is still developing. If you're under investigation, speak to a solicitor.

Jurisdiction: This covers England and Wales. The offence extends to England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

Section 179: The Three Elements the Prosecution Must Prove 1. FALSE INFORMATION The message contains information that is false Sent via electronic comms + 2. KNOWLEDGE Sender KNOWS it's false — not just suspicious Genuine belief is a defence + 3. INTENT TO HARM Intending to cause "non-trivial" harm Psychological or physical OFFENCE COMPLETE — Summary only, 6 months' imprisonment Replaced s.127(2) Communications Act 2003 — "annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety" In force 31 January 2024. No requirement that harm actually occurred.
Three elements, all required. The "non-trivial harm" threshold is the key upgrade from the old "annoyance or inconvenience" standard.

What "Non-Trivial Harm" Means

The most important phrase in section 179 is "non-trivial psychological or physical harm." It's the element that distinguishes this offence from the old s.127(2) — and it's the element that will generate the most litigation as the law develops.

Parliament deliberately chose "non-trivial" rather than "serious" or "substantial." The harm doesn't need to be life-changing. It doesn't need to require medical treatment. But it does need to be more than mere annoyance, inconvenience, or mild upset. The Law Commission, whose 2021 report provided the blueprint for the OSA offences, described the threshold as harm that is "more than trifling" — enough to warrant criminal sanction, but not so high that only the most extreme cases qualify.

In practice, "non-trivial psychological harm" could include: causing a vulnerable person to believe a loved one has died; sending fabricated evidence of a partner's infidelity designed to destroy a relationship; falsely telling someone they have been exposed to a serious disease. "Non-trivial physical harm" could include falsely warning of an imminent physical threat designed to cause a panic response or physical reaction.

What it doesn't cover: a prank. A hoax that causes brief confusion. A false statement that irritates someone. The old s.127(2) might have caught these; s.179 does not. That was the point of the reform.

Knowledge, Not Recklessness: The Higher Bar

Section 179 requires knowledge of falsity — not recklessness, not negligence. The prosecution must prove the sender actually knew the information was false. If you genuinely believed what you were posting — even if a reasonable person would have known it was false — the offence is not made out. This is a higher bar than many people assume.

The knowledge requirement operates alongside the intent requirement: the prosecution must prove both that you knew the information was false AND that you intended to cause non-trivial harm. Two separate hurdles. Both must be cleared. If the prosecution can prove knowledge but not intent — you knew it was false but didn't mean to cause harm — the charge fails. If they can prove intent but not knowledge — you meant harm but genuinely (if unreasonably) believed the information was true — the charge fails.

How s.179 Compares to Other Offences

Communications Act 2003, s.127(1): Remains in force alongside s.179. Covers grossly offensive, indecent, obscene, or menacing messages. No falsity requirement — the offence is about the character of the message, not its truth. Maximum: 6 months.

Malicious Communications Act 1988, s.1: Covers messages known or believed to be false, sent with purpose to cause distress or anxiety. Broader than s.179 in some ways (covers "believed to be false" — a lower bar than knowledge) but narrower in others (requires purpose, not intent). Maximum: 2 years on indictment.

s.179 vs the Old Law: Before and After OLD: s.127(2) Comms Act 2003 "Annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety" Repealed 31 January 2024 NEW: s.179 OSA 2023 Knowledge of falsity + intent to cause non-trivial harm In force 31 January 2024 Key change: higher threshold, fewer prosecutions, but genuine harm cases get a named offence Also relevant: MCA 1988 (believed-to-be-false + purpose, 2 years). Defamation Act 2013 (civil, truth defence).
The old law vs the new. The "annoyance or inconvenience" standard is gone — replaced by a dual knowledge-plus-intent test.
Practical Takeaways 1. You must KNOW Genuine belief = no offence 2. You must INTEND harm "Non-trivial" — not just upset 3. Both hurdles needed Prosecution must prove both 4. MCA is the alternative "Believed false" + purpose, 2yr The old "annoyance or inconvenience" standard is dead — s.179 is narrower, fairer, and harder to prove If you genuinely believe what you're posting, you have a complete defence to a s.179 charge
Four key takeaways. s.179 is narrow by design — Parliament deliberately set a higher bar.

Sources

UK Content Comply analyses content against 13 UK speech law frameworks. This article focuses on s.179 OSA 2023. For coverage of s.127, the Malicious Communications Act, or the hate speech provisions, see our UK Speech Law resources.